Questions of Fact in the Practice of Law: A Response to Allen & Pardo\u27s Facts in Law, Facts of Law by Kirgis, Paul F.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings Faculty Publications 
2004 
Questions of Fact in the Practice of Law: A Response to Allen & 
Pardo's Facts in Law, Facts of Law 
Paul F. Kirgis 
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, paul.kirgis@umontana.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Kirgis, Paul F., "Questions of Fact in the Practice of Law: A Response to Allen & Pardo's Facts in Law, Facts 
of Law" (2004). Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings. 112. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/112 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
QUESTIONS OF FACT IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW: A RESPONSE TO ALLEN & 





In their article Facts in Law and Facts of Law,
1
 Professor Ronald Allen and Michael 
Pardo criticize efforts to distinguish questions of ‘law’ from questions of ‘fact’ based on the 
nature of the issue under consideration.  In convincing fashion, they demonstrate that there is no 
ontological, epistemological, or analytical distinction between things in the real world that are 
‘facts’ and things in the real world that are ‘law.’ Their analysis rests on several insights:  that 
everything we think of as ‘law’ exists and requires proof through evidence just like all the things 
we think of as ‘facts;’ that ‘fact-finding’ requires the invocation of norms just like the 
identification of legal rules does; and that propositions of ‘law’ have truth values just like 
propositions of ‘fact.’  From these insights, Allen and Pardo conclude that when judges use the 
terms ‘fact’ and ‘law,’ they are using those terms conventionally to describe a normative 
conclusion that a particular matter should be decided by a judge (law) or should be decided by a 
jury (fact).
2
   
This is a powerful critique.  Allen and Pardo are certainly correct that ‘law’ is no 
different from any other real-world phenomena normally considered to be ‘factual.’  As they 
suggest, the question of what constitutes valid law in any given context is a factual question, and 
one that can be answered only by examining the activities of legal officials in their identification 
of law.  Law is a social institution manifested in and constructed by the actions of legal actors.  It 
is, therefore, thoroughly factual in nature.  That is the insight underlying the social sources thesis 
of legal positivism.  Efforts to distinguish ‘laws’ from ‘facts’ at this level—in relation to 
questions about the nature of law—will always fail.  Allen and Pardo’s analysis aptly 
demonstrates this important jurisprudential point. 
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But demonstrating that point does not do much to advance understanding of the fact-law 
distinction as a practice.  Despite the truism that ‘law’ and ‘fact’ are not mutually exclusive 
ontological, epistemological, or analytical categories, in practice judges invoke the fact-law 
distinction in fundamentally consistent ways every day.  As proof of this contention, consider the 
following two questions:  1) ‘How fast was the car going?’ 2) ‘What was the speed limit?’  We 
do not have to believe that ‘law’ and ‘fact’ are severable categories to recognize that any judge 
encountering those questions in a typical adjudicative context would label the first one a question 
of fact and the second a question of law.  If the objective is to shed light on the fact-law 
distinction as it is used in the real world, the method must be to identify the circumstances under 
which judges use the labels ‘law’ and ‘fact’ in practice.
3
   
Allen and Pardo seem to recognize the need for such a pragmatic analysis in their 
argument that conventional meanings of the terms ‘fact’ and ‘law’ and structural considerations 
about the competence of potential decision-makers inform choices about the allocation of 
decisional responsibility.
4
  But they never explain how these factors actually operate in practice.  
Conventional meanings derive from usage.  Speakers of a language have a shared understanding 
of the meanings of most words in that language based on the characteristics of the phenomena to 
which the words in the language are used to refer.  If I say ‘I am sitting in a chair,’ you know 
what I mean because you have an idea about the characteristics of the thing that English speakers 
call a ‘chair.’  By the same token, when judges say ‘This is a factual matter, so it should go to the 
jury,’ they are evaluating the characteristics of the matter to be decided and concluding that there 
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is something about it that indicates it falls into the class of things that we typically assign to 
juries.  To the extent it is possible to identify the factors judges use to make those choices, then it 
is also possible to give substance to the fact-law distinction.  By giving primacy to the 
conventional meanings of the terms ‘law’ and ‘fact,’ Allen and Pardo appear to concede this and 
to suggest that it would be possible to identify at least some of the characteristics of the things 
that judges call ‘fact questions’ and ‘law questions.’  But they never do that. 
Furthermore, it does not help much to say that functional considerations play an 
important role in the decision to label a question ‘factual’ or ‘legal,’ because the functional 
considerations are themselves dependent on the characteristics of the matter to be decided.  If it 
is correct that, because of differing competencies, there is a set of questions that judges should 
normally decide and a set of questions that juries should normally decide, then there must be 
particular features about typical adjudicative questions that make them candidates for one or the 
other set.  To understand how functional considerations operate, we need to know the 
characteristics of the questions that we think judges (or juries) are best suited to answer.  
Identifying the characteristics of the questions that judges label ‘fact’ and ‘law’ is an essential 
step in understanding the different structural roles of judges and juries.  
In short, while Allen and Pardo have said much that is true and nothing that is false, they 
have not succeeded in dispelling confusion about the fact-law distinction as it is used in practice.  
In a forthcoming article, I attempt to dispel that confusion in at least one context by examining 





  Here, I will distill that analysis to provide a more general, if somewhat truncated, 
account of the fact-law distinction.  In brief, I will argue that it is possible to identify consistent 
criteria in how the fact-law distinction has been applied in practice by focusing on two factors: 1) 
the purpose for which a given question is asked; and 2) the inferences required to answer that 
question.  Judges decide questions whose purpose is to determine whether the parties have set an 
issue up for decision consistent with governing legal norms.  Once it has been determined by the 
judge that an appropriate issue has been presented, the judge must decide who should resolve 
that issue.  Judges have traditionally concluded that juries should resolve issues requiring 
inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences put in dispute, while judges 
themselves may answer questions calling for deductive inferences or inductive inferences about 
matters outside the transactions or occurrences in dispute.   
This is a descriptive claim, and a relatively modest descriptive claim at that.  My goal is 
to uncover the characteristics of the questions that judges usually label as ‘fact,’ and, 
correspondingly, the characteristics of the questions that judges usually label as ‘law.’  I do not 
claim that judges explicitly rely on the understanding I suggest or that my approach explains all 
invocations of the fact-law distinction.  I also do not, for now, claim that judges should use the 
criteria I describe.  Rather, I hope to show that there is a basic underlying consistency in how the 
terms ‘fact’ and ‘law’ have been used in the allocation of decisional responsibility.  Recognizing 
the basis for that consistency can help to focus thinking on the choices judges make in assigning 
decisions to legal actors, and thereby lead to better-reasoned decisions. 
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Two Contexts for the Fact-Law Terminology 
As Allen and Pardo’s critique persuasively shows, the key to drawing useful conclusions 
about the fact-law distinction is to focus not on the meanings of terms, but on the behavior of 
judicial actors invoking the fact-law distinction in practice.  The first step in understanding how 
the fact-law distinction is used in practice is to understand how the decision process operates.  
The received wisdom holds that there is something called ‘law’ and something called ‘fact’ and 
when the two meet there is something called ‘the application of law to fact.’
6
  But that is an 
artificial decisional framework (for all the reasons Allen and Pardo give) and one that obfuscates 
rather than clarifies.  To illuminate the fact-law distinction in practice, we need a better 
paradigm—one that is not itself dependent on the fact-law construct.  At least in the Anglo-
American system, such a paradigm can be found by focusing on the adversarial process. 
In the Anglo-American system, the parties, through their lawyers, initiate the adjudicative 
process. The decision-makers—be they judges, juries, or some other kind of referee—do not 
have the power to seek out and resolve disputes.  No adjudicative decision is made unless the 
parties to the dispute put an issue up for decision in an appropriate tribunal.
7
  The process of 
raising an issue for decision begins when one of the parties invokes the power of a court.  The 
parties then set the machinery of decision in motion by first putting before the tribunal a body of 
data on which a decision may be based and then submitting a question to be answered in 
reference to the data.  This two-step process recurs throughout the litigation, first through the 
submission of motions and later through the introduction of evidence at trial and the submission 
 
 6 
of jury instructions.  The process of adjudication, then, consists not of the application of ‘laws’ to 
‘facts,’ but of the presentation of data by the parties and the submission, again by the parties, of 
questions about the data. 
The fact-law terminology is used in two distinctly different ways in this process.
8
  First, 
the term ‘law’ is used to describe actions taken by the judge in the role of adjudicative 
supervisor.  In this role, the judge monitors the actions of the parties to ensure that the 
adjudicative process unfolds in a way that comports with relevant norms.  The judge makes a 
number of ‘screening’ decisions about such matters as whether the parties have chosen an 
appropriate forum (jurisdiction), whether they have presented appropriate data for consideration 
(evidence), and whether they have posed appropriate questions (stating a claim, judgment as a 
matter of law).  
To see how this process works, assume a plaintiff in an American jurisdiction files a 
complaint alleging that the defendant acted negligently and thereby caused emotional suffering 
to the plaintiff.  Assume also that it is an accepted rule of American law that damages for 
emotional suffering are not available for conduct that is merely negligent.  If the case gets that 
far, the plaintiff will ultimately ask a jury or judge to answer a number of questions, including 
whether the defendant acted negligently and whether any such negligence caused emotional 
suffering in the plaintiff.  Now assume that the defendant files a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim (the traditional demurrer).  In this motion, the defendant is asking for a decision on 
whether the plaintiff’s proposed question—‘Did the defendant’s negligence cause the plaintiff 
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emotional suffering?’—is appropriate.  The judge answers that question (presumably in the 
negative) because it is part of the judge’s ‘screening’ role to decide whether the questions posed 
by the parties are appropriate. 
The decisions the judge makes in this ‘screening’ role are frequently referred to as 
matters of ‘law.’  Yet these screening decisions frequently involve determinations about the facts 
of the case.  To determine whether the court has jurisdiction, for example, the court must 
investigate and draw conclusions about the nature of the dispute and the characteristics of the 
parties before it.
9
  To determine whether data presented by the parties is appropriate, the court 
must apply rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule, that require the court to draw inferences 
about the events in dispute.
10
  And to decide whether a question posed by the parties is 
appropriate on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court must evaluate the parties’ 
factual allegations to determine whether a reasonable jury could find the facts to be as the parties 
claim.  Although all of these matters involve decisions on what we think of as the facts of the 
case, we assign them to the judge because we believe the judge is best suited to answer them.  
We call them matters of law because we have assigned them to the judge.  Criticisms of the fact-
law distinction as ‘artificial and problematic’ have greatest force in this context.
11
 
But the fact-law terminology also appears in a different context.  Once the judge has 
determined that the dispute is in a proper forum, that the parties have presented appropriate data, 
and that the parties have posed an appropriate question, she must decide which judicial actor—
judge or jury—should answer the question.  Traditionally, judges have made this choice by 
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reference to the fact-law distinction.  Questions that judges label as ‘fact’ go to the jury in cases 
in which a jury is properly demanded.  Questions that judges label as ‘law’ sometimes go to the 
jury as well, but may also be decided by the judge.  In civil cases in the United States, where 




For the remainder of this article, I will concentrate on the fact-law distinction as it 
appears in this context.  Because it is at this point that the merits of the case are decided, this is 
the point at which the fact-law distinction carries the greatest import.  It also seems to be the 
point at which most of the confusion surfaces.  Nobody seriously thinks juries should decide 
questions such as whether the court has jurisdiction or whether a document offered in evidence is 
hearsay.  But there is heated debate about matters such as whether juries should interpret the 
claims in a patent, to give one example to which I will return.  If we are to clarify the fact-law 
distinction, we must be able to identify the characteristics of the questions that judges 
traditionally assign to juries, and of the questions that judges traditionally reserve for themselves, 
once the merits have been reached. 
An Inferential Understanding of the Fact-Law Distinction 
The persistence of the fact-law terminology in judicial decisions allocating decisional 
responsibility between judge and jury—despite the repeated condemnations of the fact-law 
distinction as chimerical—suggests that judges believe the distinction has a basis.  I agree.  There 
is something about certain questions that leads judges to conclude that those questions are 
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‘factual’ as opposed to ‘legal.’  While judges may not consciously recognize it, the basis for the 
distinction lies in the types of inferences required to answer a given question.  In short, the 
questions that judges typically label as ‘fact’ are screened questions requiring inductive 
inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute.  All other questions are typically 
labeled as ‘law.’ 
Before proceeding, I should define some terms.  First, I use the term ‘inductive inference’ 
broadly, to encompass all probabilistic reasoning.  This means I use the term to include the 
Peircean concept of abduction or hypothesis,
13
 a type of reasoning that has frequently been 
considered an independent category of inference.  In effect, I lump all non-syllogistic reasoning 
into the category of induction.
14
  Focusing on the kinds of inferences most prevalent in 
adjudication, then, I use the term inductive inference to encompass three basic types of 
inferences:  1) that an event or condition in the past or present probably has occurred or is 
occurring; 2) that an event or condition in the future probably will occur; and 3) that a 
hypothetical event or condition probably would occur given some postulated set of 
circumstances, a type of reasoning known as the counterfactual conditional.
15
  The term ‘event or 
condition’ in these formulations includes virtually all phenomena in the world, real or 
hypothetical, including the identity of things or persons, the occurrence of physical events or 
human acts, mental states, and relations of cause and effect. 
Second, I use the term ‘transactions or occurrences in dispute’ in the sense it has in the 
American law of res judicata.
16
  This is a term of art, but its meaning is fairly straightforward.  In 
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litigation, the plaintiff must always assert that some event or condition—defined broadly as 
above—occurred and impacted the plaintiff or will impact the plaintiff in a negative way.  The 
plaintiff thus sets the terms of the debate by identifying something that happened (or in some 
cases, will happen) causing an injury that the plaintiff claims is remediable in a court of law. The 
defendant responds by challenging the plaintiff’s version of the events and/or adding new events 
or conditions that have a logical connection to those posited by the plaintiff and that are 
necessary for a full understanding of the events or conditions described by the plaintiff.  The 
‘transactions or occurrences in dispute’ are simply the events or conditions that the plaintiff has 
pointed to as causing his injury, plus the injury itself, plus logically connected events or 
conditions identified by the defendant. 
Last, I should emphasize again that judges routinely make decisions on fact questions as I 
define them, while acting in their screening role.  In deciding whether data is appropriate 
(evidence questions) or whether a question posed by the parties is appropriate (as on motions to 
dismiss or for judgment as a matter of law), the judge must draw inferences about the 
transactions or occurrences in dispute.  These sorts of questions are probably best considered fact 
questions decided by a judge. Unfortunately, they have traditionally been labeled questions of 
law, and judges seem unlikely to change that understanding.  To receive the label ‘fact question,’ 
then, a question must have survived the judge’s initial screening and require inductive inferences 
about the transactions or occurrences in dispute. 
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To demonstrate the utility of this understanding of the fact-law distinction, I will give 
some examples of common adjudicative questions.  The most common sort of ‘fact’ questions in 
adjudication are the ‘who, what, when, where’ questions.   These questions call for inductive 
inferences about past real-world events or conditions.  For example, assume that in a slip-and-fall 
case, to show that the floor of a store was wet at the time of the accident, the plaintiff calls a 
witness who saw a customer spill water on the floor just before the plaintiff’s fall.  To reach the 
desired conclusion, the decision-maker must make a probabilistic inference first that the spill 
occurred as the witness described it and then that the spilled water was still on the floor when the 
plaintiff fell.  This is a classic example of an inductive inference about the transactions or 
occurrences in dispute. 
Adjudication also involves predictive inferences about future events or conditions, most 
often in the remedies context.  For example, in deciding whether to issue an injunction, a 
decision-maker must decide whether the actions of the defendant will cause irreparable harm if 
allowed to continue.  Personal injury actions often involve determinations of future lost earnings 
as well as future pain and suffering.  Breach of contract actions may involve determinations of 
future lost profits.  All these matters require probabilistic conjectures about events in the future.  
Because those events are part of the set of events or conditions that the plaintiff has identified as 
triggering a right to recovery, these matters also involve inductive inferences about the 
transactions or occurrences in dispute. 
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Finally, perhaps the most problematic type of inference in adjudication is the 
determination of causation.  As H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré made clear in their masterful 
Causation in the Law,
17
 causation is best understood in terms of expected courses of events.  
Their explanation of the two aspects of tort causation, ‘but-for’ cause and ‘proximate’ or ‘legal’ 
cause, is worth quoting: 
The necessity of the cause for the production of the consequence means that, in 
making causal statements, we must consult our knowledge of the general course of 
events.  Under what sorts of conditions do things of this sort happen?  Does this 
kind of thing happen without that kind of thing?  The second aspect [proximate or 
legal cause] forces us to consider less definite issues and very often matters of 
degree.  Although principles distinguishing between causes and mere conditions, or 
between factors which ‘break the chain’ of causation and those which do not, are to 
be found in ordinary thought apart from the law, their application often raises 
disputable questions of classification:  Was this a coincidence?  How likely was it? 
. . .  In these questions the issue is not so much:  ‘Did X happen?’ but rather ‘Is 





In other words, determining whether event A is the but-for cause of event B requires postulating 
a likely course of events and asking whether event B would be likely to occur in the absence of 
event A.  Determining whether event A is the proximate or legal cause of event B requires similar 
but more nuanced considerations.  The decision-maker must decide whether event A is 
sufficiently extraordinary given the expected course of events to be designated a ‘cause’ rather 
than a ‘condition’ of event B for purposes of assigning fault. 
In their dependence on likely courses of events, both questions of but-for cause and 
questions of proximate cause require probabilistic inferences about hypothetical conditions in the 
world—the events that were most likely to happen given the state of the world prior to the injury.  
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If the plaintiff cannot show a likely hypothetical world in which his injury would not have 
occurred, he cannot recover.  Thus, the existence of such a hypothetical world is an aspect of the 
transactions or occurrences in dispute, and answering questions of causation requires drawing 
inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute.  
Now, note what the inferential definition of fact questions excludes.  First, the definition 
excludes all deductive inferences, regardless of the subject matter.  Where inductive inferences 
are used to generate new beliefs about the world, deductive inferences are used to classify or 
categorize existing beliefs.
19
 Deductive inferences are quite common in legal reasoning.
20
  Take 
the following syllogism as an example: 
Anyone who intentionally and unlawfully kills a human being is guilty of murder; 
A intentionally and unlawfully killed B; 
Therefore, A is guilty of murder. 
Once the decisionmaker knows that murder is defined as ‘the intentional and unlawful killing of 
a human being’ and knows that a particular defendant has intentionally and unlawfully killed 
another, the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of murder follows without any conjecture or 
speculation required.  A question calling for that sort of inference is always a question of law, 
although it is one frequently made by the jury. 
Second, the definition excludes questions calling for inferences about the conduct and 
mental states of legislators or others in constructing standards or rules of law that are ultimately 
determined to have a bearing on the resolution of the dispute.
21
 Questions posed in litigation may 
call for inductive inferences about these matters, and such inferences may be crucial to the 
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resolution of the dispute.  But the parties will almost never assert that the conduct and mental 
states of legislators or others constitute the real-world events underlying their claims and 
defenses.  In other words, plaintiffs very rarely argue that conduct undertaken by a legislative or 
judicial actor has caused the plaintiff an injury remediable in a court of law.  Occasionally 
plaintiffs have attempted to tie their alleged injuries to such legislative action, and the result has 
usually been a determination that the plaintiff lacks standing—or in other words, that the 
plaintiff’s proposed question is inappropriate.
22
 
Another major category of inference excluded from the definition is the set of inferences 
about the consequences of the litigation itself, such as the effects on the parties or others of a 
verdict or award.  Again, at various points in the litigation certain actors may consider the 
consequences of the litigation in deciding how to resolve the dispute.  But the consequences of 
the litigation cannot be the events the plaintiff points to as a basis for seeking a remedy in a court 
of law or the defendant points to as making applicable a legal defense.  
In sum, defining questions of fact in terms of inductive inferences about the transactions 
or occurrences in dispute leaves several important classes of questions of law.  Whenever a 
question requires the decision-maker to label or characterize known real-world phenomena by 
reference to the decision-maker’s pre-existing store of knowledge, it involves deductive 
inferences. And even if it requires the decision-maker to draw conjectural inferences exceeding 
the decision-maker’s pre-existing store of knowledge, so that it calls for inductive inferences, it 
does not involve a question of fact if the inferences relate to matters such as the intentions or 
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purposes of a legislature or the likely actions of other people who are made aware of the outcome 
of the litigation. 
Certain questions in adjudication do not fall neatly into either the ‘law’ or ‘fact’ category.  
These are usually characterized as ‘mixed questions of law and fact.’  Reasonableness, as in the 
law of negligence, is the classic example.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts, the definitive 
American source on the law of civil liability for personal injury, defines the standard of conduct 
required to avoid being negligent as ‘that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.’
23
  It 
states further that ‘[n]egligence is a departure from a standard of conduct demanded by the 
community for the protection of others against unreasonable risk.’
24
 Finally, the Restatement 
defines unreasonableness:  ‘Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as 
involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is 
of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular 
manner in which it is done.’
25
  This is simply another way of saying that reasonableness depends 
on the circumstances.  People might be justified in taking certain risks if taking those risks is the 
only way to avoid worse consequences.   
This weighing of risk and utility calls for counterfactual probabilistic inferences about the 
transactions or occurrences in dispute.  In requiring an inference as to whether other courses of 
conduct that the actor might have taken would have produced the same benefits at less cost, the 
question of reasonableness requires the decision-maker to speculate about how events might 
have unfolded if circumstances had been different.  If other actions that could have been taken 
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would not have produced the same benefit at less cost, the actor’s conduct was not unreasonable.  
Because this conclusion turns on hypothetical, probabilistic inferences about the actor’s 
conduct—an essential component of the transaction or occurrence in dispute—it is a question of 
fact.  
What makes the reasonableness question difficult to characterize is its invocation of 
community standards.  The decision-maker must compare the actor’s conduct against the 
community standards for behavior under similar circumstances.  Even if the probability of an 
injury was low and/or the relative utility of the conduct was high, an actor might be negligent if 
he failed to act in ways that community standards dictate for the situation. ‘If the actor does what 
others do under like circumstances, there is at least a possible inference that he is conforming to 
the community standard of reasonable conduct; and if he does not do what others do there is a 
possible inference that he is not so conforming.’
26
  Thus, a decision-maker must answer the 
question, ‘What would a person of ordinary prudence in this community do under these 
circumstances?’  Assuming the circumstances leading to the injury have been established—by 
assumption, agreement, or prior determination—answering that question does not involve factual 
inferences.  Instead of drawing inductive inferences about the specific people and events 
involved in the matter, the decision-maker must draw inductive inferences about how other 
people from the community would behave under similar circumstances.  And almost inevitably, 
the decision-maker’s own preconceived notions about how people in the community should 
behave will creep into that analysis.  Thus, determining the community standards involves 
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inductive inferences about matters beyond the transactions or occurrences in dispute, as well as 
deductive inferences about those transactions or occurrences. 
The fact that some questions include both factual and legal elements does not mean that 
the fact-law distinction is empty—it just means that the world is a complex place.  And 
understanding the fact-law distinction in inferential terms can help judges discern the relative 
weight of the factual and legal components in such difficult cases.  Sometimes the ‘factual’ 
components will predominate, while in other instances the ‘legal’ components will predominate.  
Courts that are aware of the traditional preference for giving those questions in the former 
category to the jury will, at a minimum, make more consistent and better informed decisions 
allocating decisional responsibility for difficult questions like reasonableness.  To the extent it is 
possible to show that juries are better decision-makers for ‘fact’ questions, a challenge I leave on 
the table for now, an inferential understanding of the fact-law distinction will produce decisions 
that are not just more consistent and better informed, but qualitatively superior. 
Caveat:  Judicial Manipulation of the Fact-Law Distinction 
It should be apparent that the inferential understanding of the fact-law distinction I 
propose does not constrain judges in any meaningful sense.  Judges can always make a question 
into either a fact question or a law question simply by interpreting the legal rule implicated by 
the question to require the relevant sorts of inferences.  The United States Supreme Court did 
exactly that in its decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
27
 which held that patent 
claim construction is a question of law.  The plaintiff in Markman, who wanted the jury to 
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interpret the claims in the patent, relied primarily on Bischoff v. Wethered,
28
 a case involving a 
contract for the assignment of a patent.  The plaintiff in Bischoff had determined that a prior 
patent had been awarded for an identical invention.  If that were true, the presence of the prior 
patent would nullify the patent he purchased.  He brought an action for breach of contract, in 
which the central issue was whether the two inventions were in fact identical.  In other words, 
the case turned on whether an infringement action would succeed if one were brought.  The 
Supreme Court understood the construction of the patent to require the mental recreation of the 
invention.  ‘[T]he whole subject-matter of a patent is an embodied conception outside of the 
patent itself . . . .  This outward embodiment of the terms contained in the patent is the thing 
invented, and is to be properly sought, like the explanation of all latent ambiguities arising from 
the description of external things, by evidence in pais.’
29
 Thus, the Bischoff Court saw the 
decision-maker’s role as mentally recreating the invented products based on the patents and the 
expert testimony, and then comparing the ‘invention’ described in the first patent to the 
‘invention’ described in the second patent to decide whether they are the same. It held that the 
jury should make this determination. 
The Supreme Court in Markman rejected that approach to patent law.  While it 
recognized that a ‘novelty’ action such as Bischoff might turn on the outward embodiment of the 
patent, it maintained that a patent infringement action turns on simple document interpretation.  
‘Where technical terms are used, or where the qualities or substances or operations mentioned or 
any similar data necessary to the comprehension of the language of the patent are unknown to the 
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judge, the testimony of witnesses may be received upon these subjects, and any other means of 
information be employed.  But in the actual interpretation of the patent the court proceeds upon 




Bischoff adopted an understanding of patent law that would require the decision-maker to 
draw inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute (the outward 
embodiment of the patented product).  In turn, the Bischoff Court saw patent claim construction 
as a question of fact for the jury. Markman rejected that understanding in favor of an approach 
focusing on the literal meaning of the words contained in the patent.  That approach requires no 
inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute.  It requires only deductive 
inferences about the semantic meanings of the terms in the patent.  Accordingly—and rightly 
given its understanding of what claim construction actually involves—the Markman Court saw 
patent claim construction as a question of law for the judge.   
The Supreme Court almost certainly would not have decided Markman differently had it 
understood the fact-law distinction in inferential terms.  But it might have better understood—
and better explained—why its interpretation of patent law removed claim construction from the 
province of the jury.  Ron Allen and Michael Pardo are absolutely right that misunderstandings 
about the nature of the fact-law distinction have produced ‘conceptual confusion’ in courts.  But 
they have not provided a solution to that problem.  The solution is to better understand the 
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characteristics of the questions that courts label ‘fact’ and of the questions that courts label ‘law.’  
Understanding the fact-law distinction in inferential terms can help in that process. 
 
                                              
*
Associate Professor, St. John’s University School of Law.  
1
 R.J. Allen & M.S. Pardo, ‘Facts in Law and Facts of Law,’ (2003) 7 E & P 153. 
2
 I am focusing on the fact-law distinction as it informs the choice between judge and jury at the trial stage of 
adjudication.  The analysis is similar, however, for the employment of the terminology at other stages, such as to 
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